Every September and October, entities in the palm oil and timber industries in
Indonesia, for 26 days in 2015. 9 The total annual emissions from Indonesia in 2015
were also higher than the annual emissions of each Japan and Germany. 10 There is thus a pressing need for the Southeast Asian countries to adopt solutions that would effectively solve this problem. The primary purpose of this research is to untangle the complex web of legal solutions that have been developed to address the haze pollution, focussing primarily on the efforts of Singapore and Indonesia, and where applicable, Malaysia and the rest of the member States in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN").
11 This paper is composed of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will outline the sources of international law that impact the haze such as customary international law, multilateral instruments and Singapore's extraterritorial legislation. Part three will analyze Indonesia's actions to tackle the haze. Part four will address the relative effectiveness of the solutions set out in Part two against other non-legal solutions. Ultimately, none of the legal solutions above can be considered in isolation, but must be viewed within a complex web of international pressure upon Indonesia to fulfil its obligations.
At the outset, a few observations ought to be made. First, the issue does not sit squarely within the traditional lens of public international law where States are the primary actors. 12 Here, the responsible parties are primarily large corporations in the private sector and issues of attribution to the State will therefore arise. Second, slash-and-burn activities are widely accepted as an intentional method, as it is the most cost effective way to clear the land. 13 According to research conducted by Riau University, the cost per hectare for slash-and-burn is as little as Indonesian Rupiah ("IDR") 600,000 (USD 44), against IDR 3,400,000 (USD 250) for alternative methods.
14 Third, natural meteorological conditions in the form of El Nino and positive Indian Ocean Dipole is presumed to intensify the effects of the haze. 15 The impact on exogenous factors must be kept in mind when attributing liability of the haze. Fourth, there are issues in attributing liability to the parties responsible. Concession maps may not always portray the owners or rights holders accurately, and there is often an issue of conflicting information based on different maps issued by the different authorities. 16 Further, fires easily spread to adjacent land. 17 This procedure makes it difficult to identify the actual party responsible for the original fire.
Fifth, while most of Southeast Asia has suffered from the haze, the effective solution of the problem depends almost disproportionately on Indonesia's efforts and actions.
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II. The Sources of International Law against the Haze of Indonesia
A. Customary International Law
International environmental law is "largely treaty law." 19 One would therefore be hard-pressed to find sources of customary international law that impose obligations on Indonesia to combat the haze. Nevertheless, it would still be imperative to begin with a discussion on the relevant principles of customary law. The first is the duty of a State to prevent transboundary environmental harm. A discussion of customary international law on the environment would invariably start with the classic Trail Smelter arbitration. 20 This arbitration was concerned with whether the discharge of harmful substances into the Columbia River by a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, Canada could give rise to an internationally wrongful act by Canada when such substances were transmitted downstream into Washington The second is the duty to use due diligence which was developed as an elaboration to prevent transboundary harm. Indeed, the ICJ stated that the duty of due diligence was not limited to "the adoption of appropriate rules and measures," but included "a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators … to safeguard the rights of the other party."
27 Although the standard applicable to each country depends on the level of development of the country, at the minimum, the standard of care is that of good governance which entails that the responsible State should have a legal system which is able to control and monitor the activities in question. discharge their duty to prevent transboundary pollution. Instead, enactment of law must be coupled with effective judicial enforcement.
It is clear that the two principles cited above are too vague to frame the precise contours of Indonesia's exact obligations. Indeed, none of these principles would withstand scrutiny if a dispute were brought before an international tribunal on them alone. Nevertheless, they are still important in setting the skeleton within which more specific norms are negotiated and subsequently included in treaties.
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B. Multilateral Instruments
Unlike other areas of international environmental law, there is no single global instrument in which the law of air pollution is codified. 30 The precisely due to the inability of the aforementioned political agreements to combat the regional transboundary haze. 38 Indonesia only acceded to the ASEAN Agreement in January 2015, more than a decade after it came into force in November 2003.
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The main features of the ASEAN Agreement will be described briefly. The ASEAN Agreement stipulated that parties "shall co-operate in developing and implementing measures to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution." 40 Most notably, the ASEAN Agreement provided that each party shall develop and implement legislative and other measures to deal with land fires and land clearing. 41 To this end, the ASEAN Agreement established the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control which facilitated co-operation and coordination among the Parties. 42 It served as the focal point for parties to communicate data to the ASEAN Centre. 43 To enhance the implementation of regional cooperation under the ASEAN Agreement, the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund and other financial assistance arrangements were established, 44 a provision deemed as one of the ASEAN Agreement's main successes. 45 Yet, the ASEAN Agreement had its limitations. Assistance was conditional upon the consent of the receiving party. 46 Further, the ASEAN Agreement did not provide any sanctions or stipulations on non-compliance. 47 Ultimately, the ASEAN Agreement was still very much premised on the 'ASEAN way' of conducting international relations. 48 The 'ASEAN way' focusses on unanimous and consentbased diplomacy, respect of national sovereignty and, above all, non-interference in other State's domestic affairs. The author will revisit these themes when discussing the extent of effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement in Part four below.
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C. Singapore's Extraterritorial Legislation
Singapore is the only country in the ASEAN to have enacted extraterritorial legislation to target slash-and-burn activities that result in the haze. In August 2014, the Singapore Parliament passed the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014 (hereinafter Singapore Act), 50 which is expressly stated to have 'extraterritorial application' for activities that contribute to the haze in Singapore. 51 The author would submit that such prescription of extraterritorial civil and criminal jurisdiction is consistent with the 'effects' doctrine or the objective territorial doctrine under international law. Such doctrines permit the exercise of jurisdiction for an act committed on foreign soil if it causes significant consequences within the territory of that country and the wording in the statue is sufficiently clear to displace the presumption against its extraterritorial application.
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The main functions of the Singapore Act are as follows. First, the Singapore Act establishes criminal liability 53 for entities which "cause or contribute" to the haze pollution. 54 It also establishes secondary or accessory liability for entities that condone any conduct by another entity or individual which causes or contributes to the haze. 55 As will be shown in the third point, this establishes liability not only for the entity in question, but also for parent companies if certain conditions are fulfilled. Second, the Singapore Act permits civil actions to be filed against entities which "cause or contribute" to the haze if such actions lead to personal injury in Singapore, physical damage to property in Singapore, or economic loss in Singapore. 56 This is vaguely similar to the citizen action provision in the US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Third, the Singapore Act is significant in that it reverses evidentiary hurdles by establishing certain statutory presumptions. The Singapore Act presumes that an entity "owns or occupies" the land outside Singapore if a map which has been obtained from any of the statutorily prescribed sources shows the land as owned or occupied by that entity. 58 The Singapore Act further presumes that an entity which participates in the management of another entity 'condones' conduct that caused or contributed to the haze, 59 thereby giving rise to secondary criminal and civil liability.
Accordingly, the Singapore Act presumes companies' control over their subsidiaries. Indeed, once the secondary liability presumption is triggered, the only defence available to that entity is to show that it took all reasonable measures to prevent, stop or substantially reduce such conduct by the other entity or individual. 60 Further, the evidentiary difficulty in terms of attributing haze in Singapore to forest fires in Indonesia is circumvented through the statutory presumption that the haze pollution is indeed caused if three cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (1) there is haze pollution in Singapore; (2) there is a fire outside Singapore; and (3) based on "satellite information, wind velocity and direction and other meteorological information," the smoke from the fire is moving in the direction of Singapore.
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Fourth, Part III (Administration) of the Singapore Act, specifically Sections 9, 10 and 11, empowers the Director-General of the National Environment Agency ("NEA") 62 to take additional steps to administer the Singapore Act. Section 9 of the Singapore Act permits the Director-General to send preventive measures notice to entities located outside of Singapore to prevent, reduce or control the haze (hereinafter Section 9 notice).
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In fact, the Director-General's powers under Section 9 are similar to the Environmental Protection Agency's powers to order extraterritorial clean-ups pursuant to CERCLA. 64 Section 10 of the Singapore Act permits the Director-General to furnish any person a notice to provide documents and information relevant to the matters under the Singapore Act (hereinafter Section 10 notice). 65 Section 11 further empowers the Director-General to issue a notice to secure the attendance of any person before himself for oral examination (hereinafter Section 11 notice).
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A brief mention should be made on the differences between the Sections 9, 10 and 11 notices. The failure to comply with Section 9 notice does not attract any consequences whereas Sections 10 and 11 notices do. The Singapore court may impose criminal liability on those who fail to comply with Section 10 notice.
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The failure to comply with Section 11 notice may result in the issuance of a court warrant.
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III. What Has Been Done by Indonesia?
Having set out the framework for international environmental law with regards the transboundary haze pollution in Southeast Asia, this section and the next will proceed to analyze the effectiveness of the various solutions. Yet to do so, it would be imperative to appreciate what has actually been done by Indonesia. In this section, the paper will explore the shifting paradigm of Indonesia's attitudes to solve the haze pollution. In order to appreciate the significance of the acts taken by Indonesia in recent years, the preceding years of inaction must first be highlighted.
A good starting point would be Indonesia's Law No 23/1997 on Environmental Management (hereinafter 1997 Indonesian Law) which criminalizes the intentional carrying out of an action that results in environmental pollution, attracting a maximum imprisonment of 10 years and/or a maximum fine of IDR 500 million (USD 37,000). 69 Yet, the 1997 Indonesian Law has only ever resulted in one conviction, even though 176 companies were publicly identified as violators, out of which, only 5 were eventually brought to court. 70 The one successful conviction relates to Goby, a 65 The Singapore Act, § 10(1). violate the law will no longer be granted impunity from the law. Taken in totality, these three judgments show a shift from the decades of impunity, sending a strong signal that the Indonesian courts and police are embarking on harsher enforcement measures against those who create forest fires that pollute the environment. Such judicial enforcement must be analyzed within the backdrop of greater political will as demonstrated by stronger administrative and executive enforcement. In May 2014, Indonesia's then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono vowed to adopt a 'zero tolerance' policy towards the haze, being the first Indonesian president to publicly commit taking a tough stance against illegal forest fires. 87 In December 2015, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry announced that it had suspended or revoked concessions of 23 Indonesian paper and palm oil entities. 88 Indonesia also created the Peatland Restoration Agency ("PRA") in February 2016, an agency dedicated to reducing forest fires. 89 As set out above, it included this fact in its statement on signing the Paris Agreement.
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The PRA has taken concrete steps to compel the reduction of forest fires. The PRA ordered BMH to restore 95,000 hectares of damaged peatland. 91 It has been reported that the PRA was prevented from inspecting a forest concession in Riau managed by PT Andalan Pulp and Paper. 92 PT Andalan Pulp and Paper is an Indonesian company which owns and runs a paper mill and is also the subsidiary of one of the leading pulp and paper companies based in Singapore, Asia Pacific Resource International Holdings. 93 Separately, in September 2016, environmental investigators from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry were detained and threatened by firms they were investigating. 94 The fact that firms have tried for the first time to physically hinder investigators from pursuing their investigations demonstrates that private entities are now actually worried about administrative actions. It signifies a shift away from a culture of relying on corruption to gain legal impunity. Yet, instead of backing down, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has vowed to continue pursuing the investigations 95 and has threatened to suspend Andalan Pulp and Paper's concession pending investigation.
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IV. Measuring Effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement and the Singapore Act
Ultimately, political cooperation is a primary source of obligation, with the various international law instruments as secondary tools to pressure States to cooperate. In this sense, instead of being a positive obligation, international environmental law arises as a normative and discursive dialogue to provoke political reactions.
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Within this framework, the effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement and the Singapore Act will be discussed as follows: (A) setting out the literature on measuring effectiveness of international environmental agreements; (B) measuring effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement; (C) measuring effectiveness of the Singapore Act; and (D) analysing the role of third parties.
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A. Measuring Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
A discussion on the effectiveness of legal solutions must first begin with a discussion on key features of the existing literature discussing effectiveness of international environmental law.
First, a common criticism of the ASEAN Agreement is its lack of a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and compulsive action.
99 It must be recognized that international environmental agreements lie on a separate playing field from other international agreements. The absence of a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism and sanctions for violations is not unique to the ASEAN Agreement, but Second, how does one measure compliance with international law? Does one measure the efforts taken by States to comply with their obligations, or in terms of the results based on the decrease of haze pollution levels? 101 As aforementioned,
given the uncertainties in terms of quantifying effects of forest fires, and given the ability of natural meteorological elements such as El Nino and positive Indian Ocean Dipole to affect the severity of the haze pollution, the author argues in favour of measuring the steps taken by Indonesia to reduce the problem. Further, given that only 2 years have passed since 2015, when Indonesia stepped up its efforts to enforce its laws on forest fires, the correct perception to view effectiveness is with reference to the actions Indonesia takes, not with absolute decreases in pollution levels. Indeed, Singapore's Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, Masagos Zulkifli cautioned that it would be premature to conclude on the basis of improved air quality in the single year of 2016 that the problem has been solved, given the long history of the haze problem that has spanned decades. 102 A clear pattern of reduction of pollution levels over many more years is required before one can confidently conclude that transboundary haze pollution has been reduced. This leads to the third point: how much time needs to pass before one can meaningfully measure compliance with the ASEAN Agreement and the Singapore Act? The Singapore Act was enacted less than three years ago, in August 2014, while Indonesia only acceded to the ASEAN Agreement just over two years ago, in January 2015. Would two years be a sufficient passage of time for one to measure compliance with either instrument?
Fourth, given that the Singapore Act establishes criminal and civil liability, should a conviction or a civil judgment be rendered under the Singapore Act before it is deemed successful? In other words, does the Singapore Act actually have to be invoked (and successfully invoked, on that note) before one can declare that it has served its purpose? As will be argued below, there need not be actual criminal or civil actions for the Singapore Act to be effective as long as the threat of such criminal or civil actions is credible. 103 proceed to analyze the effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement and the Singapore Act.
B. Measuring Effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement
As elaborated above, the ASEAN Agreement does not contain any mandatory dispute resolution or sanctions for those who violate the agreement. Any discussion that focuses on the effectiveness of the ASEAN Agreement must start with the acknowledgment that it is wholly reliant on the voluntary compliance of parties. In this case, the voluntariness is heightened by the fact that it is reliant on just one contracting party's compliance, being Indonesia. 104 Indonesia only acceded to the ASEAN Agreement in January 2015, more than a decade after it came into force in November 2003. The effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the ASEAN Agreement, must therefore be measured in light of when Indonesia acceded to the ASEAN Agreement. There are two parts to measuring such effectiveness. One deals with the meaning of the act of accession, while the other tackles the impact arising from the act of accession.
Dealing with the first, Louis Henkin famously observed that: "Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." 105 Academics have questioned whether States' accession to treaties ever compels them to do more than they have planned. 106 In light of such theories, it is questionable whether anything can be read into Indonesia's accession to the ASEAN Agreement. Chayse and Chayse have opined that the principle source of States' noncompliance with international agreements is not 'wilful disobedience,' but a lack of capacity.
107 In Indonesia's case, its Minister for the Environment and Forestry publicly admitted in 2002 that Indonesia rated its ability to prevent forest fires a four on a scale of one to ten. 108 This lends credibility to the hypothesis that Indonesia wished to ensure that it would be in a position to comply with its obligations under the ASEAN Agreement before ratifying the agreement. As set out above, January 2015 (the date on which Indonesia acceded to the ASEAN Agreement) is generally in line with when Indonesia started to take more stringent action to enforce its domestic laws. Or was Indonesia's accession to the ASEAN Agreement a direct reaction to the enactment of the Singapore Act just five months before? The exact pressure point, or a combination of pressure points, for Indonesia's accession to the ASEAN Agreement might never be known. What is clear, however, is what Indonesia's accession means going forward.
This brings out the second point dealing with the impact of the accession. Within a year of its accession to the ASEAN Agreement, Indonesia submitted its Plan of Action and efforts to implement such plan to the ASEAN Centre focussing on monitoring and enforcement efforts, a move which gathered acknowledgments of appreciation by the majority of the ASEAN Ministers.
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The value of the ASEAN Agreement must also be analyzed against the backdrop of the 'ASEAN way,' which is the culture of consent-based diplomacy and noninterference in other party's domestic affairs in Southeast Asia. 110 Singapore's then
Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, Dr Balakrishnan, stressed that the ASEAN cooperation "remains a critical pillar of the ultimate solution" 111 and that
Singapore would continue to work with Indonesia to solve the problem "in the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect" 112 even after the enactment of the Singapore Act.
For all that it lacks in terms of sanctions and provisions to compel adherence, the ASEAN Agreement is the only instrument that provides a neutral, nonconfrontational and acceptable forum in light of the 'ASEAN way' for States to come together to collectively tackle the haze pollution. Viewed in this regard, it lights the way for political co-operation to occur.
C. Measuring Effectiveness of the Singapore Act
The discussion of the 'ASEAN way' brings us squarely to the next sub-section, the effectiveness of the Singapore Act. At first glance, the Singapore Act appears to go against the very notions of the 'ASEAN way,' given that the notion of 'unilateral' 113 extraterritorial jurisdiction is the 'antithesis' 114 to the ASEAN spirit of interstate cooperation. This subsection will begin by setting out the actions under the Singapore Act. Thus far, Singapore's NEA has sent Section 9 notices to six Indonesian suppliers of the Asia Pulp and Paper Group, requesting them to take preventive measures to extinguish the fires on any land owned by them and submit a plan of action to prevent the recurrence of such fires.
115 The NEA has further sent Asia Pulp & Paper
Company Ltd, a company listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in Singapore, a Section 10 notice requesting information on measures taken by its subsidiaries and suppliers in Indonesia to put out fires in their concessions.
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The closest to a criminal action that has been threatened under the Singapore Act was the issuance of a court warrant against an unnamed director of an Indonesian firm after he failed to attend an interview with the NEA. 117 What is clear from the issuance of the court warrant is Singapore's unequivocal signal that it is prepared to prosecute Indonesian companies for causing transboundary haze pollution in Singapore under the Singapore Act. 118 According to the theory of coercive diplomacy, the existence of threat of criminal action in itself makes the Singapore Act effective, provided that such threat is credible. 119 Actual criminal or civil actions are not required to make the Singapore Act effective. Yet, the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the Singapore Act must also be viewed against the negative reactions by Indonesia and Malaysia to the Singapore levels. It also offered to dispatch aircrafts to assist Indonesia with putting out the forest fires. 129 Malaysia's actions show that an extraterritorial law might not be ideal in Southeast Asia.
The backlash against unilateral measures adopted by Singapore defies established norms of in Southeast Asia premised on the 'ASEAN way.' It also brings us back to primacy of the ASEAN Agreement given that it adheres to the 'ASEAN way' of consent-based diplomacy. This raises the question of whether Singapore committed an international relations faux pas by passing the Singapore Act.
The author argues that Singapore's position is consistent with the use of unilateral extraterritorial domestic legislation as a recent developing trend in international environmental law. 130 As international environmental law is primarily treaty-based, two factors should be considered. First, treaties require time to negotiate. They are unable to keep up with the proliferation of environmental problems caused by the rapid pace of economic development. Second, given that most international environmental agreements do not provide for compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms, traditional forms of transnational dispute resolution are unable to keep up with emerging trends in international environmental law. 131 Indeed, in the context of discussing the legitimacy of the extraterritorial application in US CERCLA 132 and Canada's Clean Air Act, 133 academics have argued that such legislation is merely an interim relief that serves as a catalyst to pressure the other State to engage in bilateral negotiations and to regulate their domestic environmental problems more actively. 134 Consistent with the 'polluter pays' principle, extraterritorial domestic environmental legislation directs its focus towards the 'true parties' responsible, i.e. the private parties, instead of the States. 135 The author would argue that the Singapore Act conforms with the 'ASEAN Way' by directing the spotlight away from Indonesia's actions and focusing on the responsible entities. Indeed, when Singapore's Minister of the Environment and Water Resources responded to Indonesia's allegation that Singapore had violated international law through its issuance of the court summons, the Minister focussed on the acts of the private actors, rather than Indonesia's role in this course. Also, Singapore stressed that the Singapore Act is not intended to replace other countries' domestic laws and enforcement actions, but merely complements efforts of other countries to hold errant companies to account. 136 Further, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the 'effects' doctrine is not without its flaws. Jurisdiction based on the 'effects' doctrine or 'objective territorial' jurisdiction as it is otherwise known, is one of the most controversial bases of jurisdiction.
137 Critics have argued that it leads to jurisdictional conflict between
States, 138 which can be a slippery slope towards asserting universal jurisdiction,
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especially in relation to crimes that the international community has not yet recognized as having universal jurisdiction.
To prevent a jurisdictional conflict, this paper would submit that Indonesia ought to be the primary country exercising jurisdiction over such crimes given that it may assert jurisdiction based on territorial and nationality principles. It is only when Indonesia is unwilling and/or unable to effectively enforce its laws that Singapore may exercise its enforcement jurisdiction of the Singapore Act over actors based in Indonesia.
As such, while the Singapore Act has been successful by posing as a credible threat for Indonesia to take more effective measures to enforce its own laws and engage with the voluntary mechanisms of the ASEAN Agreement, its successes end there. Seeing the rootedness of the 'ASEAN way' in the context of diplomacy in Southeast Asia, the Singapore Act will ultimately yield to the ASEAN Agreement as the latter squares with established notions of the 'ASEAN way.'
D. Analysing the Role of Third Parties
Thus far, this paper has analyzed the effectiveness of solutions to solve the transboundary haze pollution problem through the lenses of state action, with a primary focus on legal action and a secondary focus on political action. However, no discussion on solutions to combat the transboundary haze pollution would be complete without analysing the role of third parties, such as non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and private entities.
Both NGOs and the private sector have been instrumental in applying pressure on actors that cause the haze pollution. An Indonesian-based NGO, WALHI, announced in October 2015 that it would be filing a class action suit against the largest palm oil and pulp and paper entities before the Indonesian courts on behalf of 50 residents in Jambi, South Sumatra who were affected by the forest fires in 2015. 140 It is reported that the total damages claimed in this class action stands at a stellar IDR 51 trillion (USD 3.5 billion). 141 This class action was reportedly tried before the Pekanbaru District Court in Riau, Indonesia in March 2016 in the absence of the defendants. 142 A representative from WALHI stated that they were emboldened to take such an ambitious step given that 2015 was 'extraordinary' and "different from earlier incidents" in terms of the extent to which it affected Malaysia and Singapore. 143 Likewise, an NGO based in Singapore, the Haze Elimination Action
Team, contemplated filing a class action under the civil action provisions of the Singapore Act. 144 The true power of third party actors lies beyond the legal framework, but in applying financial pressure. At the heart, there is the appreciation that the culpable actors are large profit-driven private companies. This is where the private sector comes in. The haze pollution, like every other environmental problem, is a negative externality. Effective solutions must therefore find a way to embed the negative environmental externalities within the prices of existing markets. 145 The market pressure is specifically strong for the corporations in the palm oil industry given that, in 2014, Indonesia accounted for approximately half of the world's production of palm oil by volume. 146 A movement that has been gaining momentum is the increasing awareness of palm oil that has been certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil ("RSPO").
147 The RSPO is a voluntary initiative that developed a set of criteria for sustainable palm oil with which entities must comply in order to receive certification. Entities whose subsidiaries or suppliers are involved in causing forest fires would not receive the RSPO certification. One of Singapore's main supermarkets, NTUC FairPrice mandated that its house brand edible oils must be sourced from RSPOcertified palm oil sources.
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Several large global multi-national enterprises, Nestle, Unilever, Mars and Kellog took steps to suspend business with Malaysian-based IOI Group after its certification had been suspended by the RSPO in April 2016.
149 Another sector that is particularly active in promoting sustainable environmental practices is banking. International banks whose Asian headquarters are in Singapore have increasingly refused loans or terminated existing loans to palm oil companies that are not RSPO certified.
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However, the crippling effect to the business of such companies remains to be seen. Only one Asian-based bank has signed up to the RSPO initiative and companies may therefore turn to local or regional financial institutions which might not be as strict on RSPO certification for alternative sources of finance.
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Given the vastness of third party actions to solve the haze pollution, this paper is only able to scrape the tip of the iceberg by setting out key examples of the variety of such initiatives. With increasing awareness of the haze pollution, the author is confident that these third party initiatives which target errant companies' financial profits would only become more effective over time.
V. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed three forms of international legal solutions to the problem of transboundary haze pollution in Southeast Asia: customary international law, the ASEAN Agreement, and the extraterritorial Singapore Act. Despite the seeming simplicity of these instruments on the surface, "untangling the complex web" of their interconnectedness is a more difficult exercise. Such complexity is further exacerbated by the dynamics of market forces, as third parties are in a position to exert financial and reputational pressure on such errant entities to internalize the negative externalities of the haze.
As aforementioned, the ethos of the 'ASEAN way' of consent-based diplomacy, regarding national sovereignty and non-interference in other State's domestic affairs is so deeply embedded within all State-to-State actions in the ASEAN that any meaningful discussion on the successes of legal solutions ultimately depends on the political will of the relevant States where forest fires occur.
The greatest weakness of the ASEAN Agreement -being its failure to compel behavior by not having a binding dispute resolution mechanism -is concurrently its greatest success as it is viewed by all State parties as a neutral, non-confrontational forum to address the haze pollution. While the Singapore Act appears more aggressive than the ASEAN Agreement in compelling action to solve the transboundary haze, it is nevertheless ultimately reined in by having to work within the ethos of the 'ASEAN way.' Therein lies the rub. If the Singapore Act were not invoked, it would be seen as ineffective. Yet, there is a risk that over-invocation of the Singapore Act may strain the relations between Singapore and Indonesia, which may in turn be counterproductive in solving the root of the haze pollution.
In this regard, the primacy of Indonesia's political will cannot be understated. Even if such political will had been spearheaded by Singapore and other ASEAN States, this paper commends the shift in Indonesia's attitude to address the haze solution since 2015. Without Indonesia's efforts, any discussion on the effectiveness of customary law, the ASEAN Agreement or the Singapore Act will be ultimately proven futile. Viewed through this filter, the three forms of international law serve as a normative and facilitative source, rather than a positive source, in nudging Indonesia to enforce its domestic laws more stringently.
